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Notes
California's Parental Consent Statute: A
Constitutional Challenge
by
THERESA M. WALKER*

The landmark decision of Roe v. Wade 1 elevated a woman's right of
procreative choice to constitutional dimensions, yet it did not address the
extent to which this right applied to minors. Historically, the constitutional rights of minors have not been coterminous with the rights of
adults. 2 A state's interests in protecting minors' welfare and promoting
family integrity have justified state infringement of minors' constitutional
rights. 3 Recognizing these interests and the unclear scope of minors'
rights to procreative choice, many legislatures responded to Roe by enacting laws that mandate parental involvement in pregnant minors' abor4
tion decisions.
* B.S. 1981, University of California, Los Angeles; A.A. (R.N.) 1983, Mount Saint
Mary's College; Member, Third Year Class.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979) (finding that a pre-admission adversary hearing is not required when parents seek to commit their minor children to a mental
institution); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (no right to a jury trial in
criminal prosecution of a juvenile); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968) (upholding law criminalizing the sale of sexually oriented magazines to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of a law making it a crime
for children to sell merchandise in public places).
3. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979); see Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
4. Melton & Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in ADOLESCENT
ABORTION, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSuES 4 (G. Melton ed. 1986). Twenty-three states
have some form of either mandatory parental notification or consent abortion legislation in
effect. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PARENTAL NOTICE LAWS, THEIR CATASTROPHIC IMPACT ON TEENAGERS' RIGHT TO ABORTION 29 (1986) [hereinafter ACLU].

NOTIFICATION: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-5, 15-11-110 et. seq. (Supp. 1987); IDAHO
CODE § 18-609(6) (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. § 81-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West

Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5020-107 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.255
(Michie 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Anderson Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 767-304 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-4 (1985).
CONSENT: ALA. CODE §§ 26-21-1 et. seq. (Supp. 1987); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362152 (Supp. 1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.5 (West Supp. 1988); IND. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-58.5[169]
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As these laws have been presented for review, the Supreme Court
has grappled with the problems of defining the limits of a minor's right to
procreative choice and determining the extent to which parental involvement may be required without excessively burdening that right. In decisions subsequent to Roe, the Court has recognized a minor's qualified
right to procreative choice.5 While an absolute parental veto is unconstitutional, 6 parental consent may be constitutionally required as long as
there is alternative recourse for minors mature enough to make an inminors whose best interdependent abortion decision and for immature
7
ests are not served by parental involvement.
In passing Assembly Bill 2274 (AB 2274),8 California recently
joined the list of states in which parental consent statutes have been enacted. California's Parental Consent Statute requires unemancipated minor women to obtain the consent of one parent for an abortion, but
2.5 (Burns 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (West Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West
1983); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to -63 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028
(Vernon Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1 (1985 Interim Supp.); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3206 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4441-30 (Law. Co-op, 1976).
Nine of these statutes are currently under court injunction. ARIZONA: Roe v. Collins,
No. 85-2118 PHX CLH (D. Ariz., Aug. 14, 1987) (permanent injunction); CALIFORNIA:
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, No. 884574 (Calif. Sup. Ct., San Francisco
Dec. 28, 1987) (preliminary injunction); No. A-040-856 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1987) (request
for emergency hearing denied); No. S-003818 (Cal. Feb. 25, 1988) (request for emergency
hearing denied), appeal docketed, No. A-040-911 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1988); GEORGIA:
Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Atlanta v. Moore, No. C89-1159A - RHH (N.D. Ga. July 11,
1988) (preliminary injunction); ILLINOIS: Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill.
1984), vacated in part and remanded, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'g by an equally divided
court, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987) (per curiam); KENTUCKY: Eubanks v. Collins II, No. C282-0360 L(A) (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 1988) (continuing temporary restraining order); MISSISSIPPI:
Barnes v. Mississippi, No. J86-0458 (W) (S.D. Miss. filed July 24, 1986) (preliminary injunction); NEVADA: Glick v. McKay, 616 F. Supp. 322 (D. Nev. 1985) (preliminary injunction);
OHIO: Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ohio 1986)
(permanent injunction), aff'd, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988); PENNSYLVANIA: Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, No. 88-3228 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1988)
(preliminary injunction).
Three other statutes are facially unconstitutional and generally not enforced because they
fail to provide minors with a judicial by-pass alternative: Idaho, Montana, and South Carolina. ACLU, supra, at 29.
5. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-42
(1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
6. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
7. Akron Center, 462 U.S. at 439-40; Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462
U.S. 476, 491 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 420 (1981); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48.
8. 1987 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 4534, ch. 1237 (Deering) (codified at § 34.5 CAL. CIV.
CODE § 25298; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 317, 318 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
(Deering Supp. 1988) [hereinafter Chapter 1237].
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provides a judicial bypass alternative for mature minors and for immature minors whose best interests are furthered by a confidential abortion. 9
The Parental Consent Statute appears to comply with the federal
constitutional standards set by the United States Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird.10 It must, however, also withstand the stricter scrutiny of
the California Constitution to be enforceable.1 1 While enforcement of
the statute is currently barred by preliminary injunction, 12 no California
appellate court has passed on the validity of the statute under the California Constitution. This Note argues that AB 2274 does not survive
California constitutional analysis.
The first three sections of this Note lay a foundation for evaluating
the statute. Section I describes the problem of teenage pregnancy in California and highlights the adverse consequences of teenage childbearing.
Section II then reviews the adult right to privacy and the more specific
right of procreative choice under federal and California law. In section
III, the Note examines the extent to which the rights to privacy and
procreative choice have been extended to minors. The California
Supreme Court has not yet determined the scope of California minors'
rights to procreative choice, 13 nor the relevant interests of parents and

the state in this context. To clarify the ultimate constitutional analysis,
the Note reviews federal precedent in the area of minors' privacy rights
and analogous state precedent to identify the proper scope of the rights
and interests of the parties under California law.
9. Minors who have become emancipated through marriage, service in the armed forces,
or judicial declaration, CAL. CIV. CODE § 62 (West 1982), are able to consent to all medical
care. CAL. CIV. CODE § 63 (West Supp. 1985). In addition, CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.6 (West
1982) authorizes any minor fifteen years of age or older who is living separate and apart from
his or her parents or guardian and managing his or her own affairs (even though not fully
emancipated) to consent to all medical and dental care. In the case of such a minor, the
medical or dental practitioner is authorized, with or without the consent of the minor, to
advise the minor's parent or guardian of the treatment given or needed. Id
10. 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979).
11. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 276-77,
226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 378 (1986); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.
3d 252, 262-63, 625 P.2d 779, 783-84, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (1981).
12. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, No. 884574 (Calif. Sup. Ct., San
Francisco Dec. 28, 1987) (order granting preliminary injunction); No. A-040-856 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 31, 1987) (request for emergency hearing denied); No. S-003818 (Cal. Feb. 25,
1988) (request for emergency hearing denied), appealdocketed, No. A-040-911 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 8, 1988).
13. In Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 878, 484 P.2d 1345, 1348, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4
(1971), the California Supreme Court held that minors could consent to abortion without parental approval. CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.5 (West 1982) (amended 1987), which permitted unmarried pregnant minors to give consent to the furnishing of hospital, medical, and surgical
care related to pregnancy, was interpreted as including therapeutic abortion because it was not
specifically excluded by the legislature. That case is not controlling here since the issue raised
is whether the legislature's attempt to expressly exclude abortion from the procedures to which
a minor may independently consent is constitutional.
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Sections IV and V find the Parental Consent Statute vulnerable to
California constitutional attack because the statute (1) gives a third party
absolute veto power over a minor's abortion decision and (2) creates a
burden on minors' fundamental rights without advancing significant
state interests. The Note concludes that the disparity between the stated
purposes of the statute and its potential effects demonstrates that AB
2274 is an unconstitutional attempt to deter and prevent abortions. Finally, the Note proposes that California courts should not tolerate this
unconstitutional burden on minors' privacy rights and should permanently enjoin AB 2274 from enforcement.
I.

Consequences of Teenage Childbearing

14
In 1985, more than 140,000 California teenagers became pregnant.
5
Half of these pregnancies ended in abortion.' Since at least twenty-five
percent of teenagers seeking abortions do not consult their parents,
thousands of teenagers will be affected by California's Parental Consent
Statute.'6 Before evaluating the specific burdens imposed by the statute,
the adverse consequences to California teenagers unable to exercise the
right to procreative choice is worthy of examination.
Justice Powell noted in Bellotti v. Baird,1 7 "[C]onsidering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a
minor ....[T]here are few situations in which denying a minor the right
to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and indelible."' 8 The adverse consequences of teenage pregnancy are well documented. On average, young women who give birth while in high school
14.

MEDICAL CARE STATISTICS SEC. DEPT. OF HEALTH SERVICES, NUMBER OF ESTI-

MATED PREGNANCIES AMONG FEMALES AGED 13-19 BY OUTCOME WITH BIRTH, ABORTION
AND PREGNANCY RATES, CALIF. 1985 (Apr. 1987) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
Because California's Parental Consent Statute applies exclusively to minors, it will affect only
teenagers under age 18.
15. Id.
16. See Cartoof & Klerman, ParentalConsentfor Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts
Law, 76 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 397, 398-99 (Apr. 1986) (Survey of teenagers' consent practices under Massachusett's Parental Consent Law indicated that 25 percent of teenagers remaining in state obtained consent from a judge. An additional 33 percent obtained an abortion

in another state); Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek CourtAuthorized Abortions 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259, 260 (1983) ("Abortion clinics and referral
services in [three states with parental involvement statutes] report that some 20-55 percent of
their minor patients are going to court rather than confiding in their parents."); Torres, For-

rest & Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents, Use of Family Planning and
Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 289, table 7 (1980) (When teenagers were asked what
they would do if a clinic were to notify their parents, about 25 percent said they would not
come to the clinic for an abortion).
17. 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979).

18.

Id.
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complete fewer years of school and are less likely to finish college than
those who delay childbearing until their twenties.19 They are also more
likely to have larger families. 20 Larger family size and educational deficits compound the problems these women have in finding stable employment. 21 Moreover, teenage mothers have fewer prospects of achieving
stable marital relationships and are likely to be the only source of support
for their families. 22 The result of these disadvantages is that adolescents
who become mothers are disproportionately poor and dependent on public assistance for economic support. 23 This poverty takes a toll not only
on those directly affected, but also on society at large. Indeed, the total
welfare, Medicaid, and Food Stamp program costs in 1985 for families
begun by
a birth to a teenager reached a staggering 16.65 billion
24
dollars.
Teenage pregnancies present unusual medical risks, as well. First,
pregnant teenagers have a higher incidence of complications, maternal
25
morbidity and mortality, and premature or low birth weight babies.
Low birth weight is a major cause of infant mortality and serious childhood illness. 26 Poor health habits and the failure to seek early prenatal
care exacerbate the risks of adolescent childbearing
for teenagers from
27
low income families and for their babies.
In addition to the problems they have at birth, children born to
28
teenage mothers are more likely to be injured and to be hospitalized.
They are also at greater risk of lower intellectual and academic achievement and social behavior problems 29 and are more likely to become ado30
lescent parents themselves.
For adolescents unable to surmount state-imposed obstacles to ter19. RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SExuALITY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING 126 (C. Hayes ed. 1986) [hereinafter RISKING THE FUTURE].
20. Id at 132.
21. Id. at 130.
22. Id
23. Id at 131.
24. Id. at ix.
25. Id. at 136. Mothers under age 15 suffer maternal death 2.5 times more often than
mothers age 20 to 24. Teenage mothers under age 15 are also twice as likely to have premature
or low birthweight (less than 5.5 pounds) infants. ALAN GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, TEENAGE PREGNANCY: THE PROBLEM THAT HASN'T GONE AWAY 28

(1981).

26. Menken, SubstantiallyHigher Morbidity and Mortality Rates FoundAmong Infants
Born to Adolescent Mothers, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 91, 91-92 (1984). "Infants born to

mothers ages 10-14 were more than three times more likely to die than those born to mothers
ages 20-24. Infants born to mothers ages 15-19 were more than 1.5 times more likely to die
than those born to mothers ages 20-24." CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE HEALTH OF
AMERICA'S CHILDREN 8 (1988).
27. RISKING THE FUTURE, supra note 19, at 124.
28. Id
29. Id at 134.
30. Id
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minate an unwanted pregnancy, the repercussions are profound. Teenage childbearing can adversely affect a young woman's physical,
financial, educational, and occupational future. As recognized in California, the right to decide whether to terminate or continue her pregnancy is fundamental and "central to a woman's control not only of her
own body, but also to the control of her social role and personal
destiny. ' 31 This is particularly true for an adolescent faced with an unwanted pregnancy. A statute restricting an adolescent's right to procreative choice must therefore be examined in light of the adverse
consequences that she will suffer should she be unable to overcome that
burden.
11.

The Adult Right to Privacy

The adult right to privacy is a fundamental right under the United
States Constitution. 32 Often termed "the right to be let alone, '3 3 the
right to privacy defines the spheres within which the government may
not act without sufficient justification. 34 The Constitution protects
against invasion of privacy by unlawful search and seizure3 5 and against
36
unwarranted government intrusion in certain personal choices.
The personal choice aspect of the right to privacy encompasses the
decision to marry37 and the procreative decisions3 8 to use contracep31. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 275, 625 P.2d
779, 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 879 (1981).
32. The right to personal choice or sexual privacy is not expressly stated in the United
States Constitution. While it is afforded fundamental protection, there is a lack of agreement
on the source of that right. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-85 (1965) (Douglas, J., plurality opinion) (penumbras of the Bill of Rights); id. at 499 (Goldberg, Brennan, J.J.,
Warren, C.J., concurring) (ninth amendment); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)
(due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
33. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted
with approval in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 n.10 (1972); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 434 n.18 (1981).
34. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 434 n.18.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in relevant part: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....
See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) which
underscores the nature of fourth amendment rights to be personal security, personal liberty
and personal property).
36. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
37. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1978); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
38. Procreative choice is "the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541-43 (1942) (mandatory sterilization of habitual criminals unconstitutional).
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tives 39 and to obtain abortion services. 4° The right "protects both the
woman's 'interest in independence in making [these] ...important deci-

sions' and her 'individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters.' "41
A. The Federal Right to Privacy: Procreative Choice
As mentioned above, the general right to privacy protects the more
specific right to make procreative choices. The right to procreative
choice is the right of a woman to decide "whether to bear 43or beget a
child" 42 and includes the decision to terminate a pregnancy.
While the decision to end a pregnancy is constitutionally protected,
the right to make that choice is not unrestricted. A state may limit the
availability of abortions during the later stages of pregnancy. Yet, because this right is fundamental and protects a decision viewed "basic to
individual dignity and autonomy,""4 regnlations limiting this right may
be justified only by a compelling state interest. 45 State restrictions must
also be drawn narrowly to express only those compelling interests, 46 and
they cannot be unduly burdensome. 47
B. The California Right to Privacy: Procreative Choice
California privacy rights are protected by both the state and federal
constitutions. Under the supremacy clause,48 state constitutional rights
may not limit the scope or protections of federal rights. States may, however, recognize more expansive rights than those existing under federal
law. 49 Thus, the United States Constitution sets the minimum level of
protection afforded privacy rights; but states are free to provide greater
protection of these rights 50 and may invalidate laws that violate the
39. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453;
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
40. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983)
(reaffirming Roe v. Wade); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,153 (1973).
41. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 434-35 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Whalen
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453.
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
Id. at 156; Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1977).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147-48

(1976).
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides in relevant part: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby ...."'
49. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
50. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has recognized its independent responsibility
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states' stricter standards.5 1
An independent state right to choose whether or not to bear a child
is well established in California constitutional law. In its 1969 decision
of People v. Belous,52 the Supreme Court of California first recognized the
constitutional right of procreative choice, four years before the United
States Supreme Court recognized the existence of a comparable federal
right in Roe v. Wade.5 3 This judicial protection of privacy rights was
apparently endorsed in 1972 when the California voters specifically added the right of privacy to the other inalienable rights of individuals enu54
merated in article I, section 1 of the state constitution.
Noting the absence of a specifically articulated federal right to privacy, the California Supreme Court has refused to rely on federal precedent to restrict the scope of the California right to privacy 55 and has read
the state right more broadly than the federal right.5 6 The court has charto safeguard the rights of California citizens. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 261, 625 P.2d 779, 783, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870 (1981).
51. See generally Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252,
625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981) (statute restricting circumstances under which public
funds would be authorized to pay for abortions for Medi-Cal recipients held unconstitutional).
52. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359-60 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 915 (1970).
53. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
54. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended 1972, repealed and reinstated 1974) provides: "All
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
Some have questioned whether the constitutional right to privacy includes the right to
procreative choice. See Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 304, 625 P.2d at 811, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 898
(Richardson, J., dissenting). However, "[this declaration of constitutional independence ...
'did not originate at [the] election; indeed the voters were told the provision was a mere reaffirmation of existing law.'" Id. at 262 n.5, 625 P.2d at 784 n.5, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871 n.5 (quoting People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 551, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 330
(1975)). Thus, at the very least, the right encompasses judicially recognized privacy rights at
the time of the election. Subsequent opinions have firmly established that the right to privacy
articulated in the California Constitution includes the right to procreative choice. Myers, 29
Cal. 3d at 262-63, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871; Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van
de Kamp, 181 Cal App. 3d 245, 276-77, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 378 (1978).
55. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 263, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 n.3, 610 P.2d 436, 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 n.3
(1980).
Indeed, California has established a large body of case law wherein judicial interpretation
of the California Constitution has provided greater protection than that afforded by comparable provisions of the United States Constitution. See Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 261 n.4, 625 P.2d at
783 n.4, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 870 n.4 (cases cited therein).
State authority to recognize more expansive rights than those existing under federal law
has been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court. Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
56. "The federal right... 'appears to be narrower than what the voters approved in 1972
when they added "privacy" to the California Constitution.'" Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 263, 625
P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (quoting Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 n.3, 610 P.2d 436,
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acterized the right to procreative choice as "among the most intimate
and fundamental of all constitutional rights,"' 57 "central to a woman's
control not only of her own body, but also to the control of her own
not only the
social role and personal destiny."158 The right encompasses
59
right to choose but also the woman's right to life.
Under both the United States and California Constitutions, regulations limiting the right to procreative choice can be justified only by a
compelling state interest, 6° must be drawn narrowly to express only that
interest, 61 and cannot be unduly burdensome. 62 To withstand the stricter
scrutiny of the California Constitution, statutes burdening fundamental
63
rights also must be necessary to accomplish a permitted state policy
and must be the least obtrusive means by which the state can effectuate
its objective.64
Because the broader scope of the California right to procreative
choice has been defined in the context of adult rights, it is unclear
whether the same protections apply to minors. The following discussion
will review federal and state precedent in the area of minors' privacy
rights to determine the appropriate scope of minors' privacy rights under
California law.

III. Extending Privacy Rights to Minors
"Few issues in our society are as emotionally laden as the conditions
440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 n.3); see PlannedParenthoodAffiliates, 181 Cal. App. 3d at
276-77, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (1986).
57. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 275, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
58. Id., 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (citing Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term-Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1,
57-58 (1977)).
59. People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 326, 503 P.2d 257, 261, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1972);
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970) (the woman's own right to life implicated in the mortality risks
inherent in continued pregnancy).
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d
143, 163-66, 707 P.2d 760, 773-74, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 400-01 (1985); Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at
964, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360; PlannedParenthoodAffiliates, 181 Cal. App. 3d at
279, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (1986).
61. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156; Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977); Conservatorship, 40 Cal. 3d at 163-66, 707 P.2d at 773-77, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 400-01.
62. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147-48
(1976); see Conservatorship,40 Cal. 3d at 163-66, 707 P.2d at 773-77, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 400-01.
63. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 964, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360; Conservatorship,40
Cal. 3d at 164, 707 P.2d at 774, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 401; PlannedParenthoodAffiliates, 181 Cal.
App. 3d at 279, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
64. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 964, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360; PlannedParenthood
Affiliates, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 279, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 379; see Conservatorship, 40 Cal. 3d at
164-65, 707 P.2d at 774, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
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under which abortion should be legally available." 65 This is especially
true in relation to adolescents' access to abortion services because, aside
from the moral issues, "it raises the profound dilemma of the proper
ordering of the interests of the adolescent, her family and the state."' 66 As
the controversy centers on the rights and interests of these parties, analysis can be clarified by initially identifying the relevant rights and interests, their nature, and their scope.
A. Rights of Minors
Until recent years, minors were afforded little protection under the
United States Constitution. Indeed, it was not until 1967 that the
Supreme Court established that minors are "persons" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. 67 Since then, a
68
number of constitutional guarantees have been extended to minors.
Noting that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority," the
United States Supreme Court determined that minors are also protected
69
by the right to privacy.
Federal courts have held that the right to privacy protects a minor
from undue state intrusion in her procreative choice. Yet, a minor's
right to choose an abortion is narrower than an adult's. This limitation is
rooted in the Supreme Court's recognition that "the power of the state to
control the conduct of children [reaches] beyond the scope of its authority over adults."' 70 Laws restricting the freedom of minors may be justified "even though comparable restraints on adults would be
constitutionally impermissible. ' ' 71 Accordingly, states are granted
greater latitude in regulating the activities of minors in recognition of the
65.

Melton & Pliner, supra note 4, at 1.

66. Id.
67. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967). Traditionally, minors were entitled "not to liberty, but to custody." Id.
68. Minors have several constitutional rights. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541
(1975) (prohibition of double jeopardy); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (procedural
due process in civil contexts); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (various substantive and
procedural rights in juvenile court proceedings, including requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (free speech);
Gault, 387 U.S. at 41, 55, 57 (rights to notice, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination,
and not to incriminate oneself); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (equal
protection against racial discrimination).
69. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976).
70. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
71. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 56 U.S.L.W. 4079 (1988) (school officials have broad
power to censor student newspapers and other school-sponsored activities); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state may ban certain material from minors even though it could
not constitutionally ban the same materials from adults).

November 1988] CALIFORNIA'S PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE

179

states' interests in protecting minors and providing for their welfare. 72
Thus, under the United States Constitution, any state interference with a
minor's privacy right may be justified by a "significant state interest...
that is not present in the case of an adult."7 3 The "significant state interest" standard is less rigorous than the "compelling state interest" test
applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults.74
Like the United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme
Court has recognized minors as persons under the state constitution. 75
While the California Supreme Court has held that the scope of minors'
constitutional rights is more limited than that of adults' rights, 76 it has
afforded minors' due process rights greater protection than federal courts
have.77 Although the California Supreme Courthas not yet considered
minors' rights to sexual privacy, 78 it has readily afforded minors the protections encompassed within the general concepts of privacy when faced
with privacy issues. 7 9 Additionally, the only appellate court to examine
the issue suggested that the
broader protections of California's privacy
80
rights extended to minors.
An issue currently unresolved in California constitutional analysis is
whether California courts should adopt the less protective "significant
72. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66.
73. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75; Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977).
74. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15.
75. In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d 550, 556, 709 P.2d 1287, 1290, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121
(1985); In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 401, 595 P.2d 105, 108, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
76. In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 558, 709 P.2d at 1291, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 122; In re
Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d at 401, 595 P.2d at 108, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
77. Compare In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 927, 935-36, 569 P.2d 1286, 1289, 1296-97,
141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 301, 306-07 (1977) (under California and United States Constitutions, due
process protection of the liberty interests of minors requires a precommittment hearing before
a neutral factfinder before they can be committed by their parents to state mental hospitals;
administrative hearing required to satisfy due process); with Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 60506, 607 (1978) (under United States Constitution, post-admission hearing does not violate the
liberty interests of minors committed by their parents to a state mental hospital; administrive
hearing is not required; a staff physician's determination of the need for committment is sufficient). This case, however, did involve an express break with federal precedent.
78. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 278, 226
Cal. Rptr. 361, 379 (1986). The right to sexual privacy, however, has been recognized for a
mentally incompetent 29 year old. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 161, 707
P.2d 760, 772, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 399 (1985).
79. Vescovo v. New Way Enter., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 587-88, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89
(1976) (minor may maintain a tort action for invasion of privacy). Minors are protected by the
constitutional prohibition of unlawful search and seizure (CAL. CONST., art. I, § 13). In re
William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 557-58, 709 P.2d at 1290-91, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 121-122 (public
school official's warrantless search of minor's locker found an unlawful invasion of privacy); In
re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d at 402, 595 P.2d at 108-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75 (warrantless,
parent-approved police search of minor's personal property found an unlawful invasion of
privacy).
80. See Planned ParenthoodAffiliates, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
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state interest" standard when reviewing statutes that burden the privacy
rights of minors. The California courts are not bound to adopt the less
protective federal standard of review. Moreover, California precedent
provides some authority for use of the "compelling interest" test in evaluating state infringement of minors' privacy rights.
In its 1971 decision of Ballardv. Anderson, 1 the California Supreme
Court held that minors could obtain an abortion without parental consent. Although the holding was based on statutory construction, 82 the
court suggested that restrictions on a minor's ability to consent to an
abortion must be based on a "compelling" state interest.8 3 In 1985, the
court in Conservatorshipof Valerie N.8 4 used a compelling interest test in
evaluating a law which infringed the sexual privacy interests of a twentynine year old incompetent woman. The rights of incompetents, like the
rights of minors, have traditionally been subject to greater state interference than those of adults.85 In using the stricter "compelling interest"
standard in this context, the California Supreme Court has demonstrated
its willingness to extend the stronger protections of the adult right to
privacy.
The right to procreative choice is recognized by the California
Supreme Court "as among the most intimate and fundamental of all constitutional rights,"' 86

"....

central to a woman's control not only of her

own body, but also to the control of her own social role and personal
destiny."' 87 Given the innumerable adverse consequences of teenage
childbearing, this is especially true for an adolescent facing an unwanted
pregnancy. The importance of this right demands the protection of a
stricter standard. Accordingly, the California courts should decline to
adopt a diluted standard of review merely because the rights at issue belong to a minor and should use the "compelling" interest test for minors
as well as for adults.
Even if the California courts adopt the less rigorous test, a state
must show significant state interests to justify burdening a minor's fundamental right. Failing this test means a fortiori that California's Parental
81. 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883-84, 484 P.2d 1345, 1352-53, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8-9 (1971).
82. See supra note 13.
83. Ballard, 4 Cal. 3d at 880, 484 P.2d at 1350, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 6. But see Planned
ParenthoodAffiliates, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 279, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (applying the significant
state interest standard in evaluating minors privacy rights).
84. 40 Cal. 3d 143, 164, 707 P.2d 760, 774, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 401 (1985).
85. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (physical restraint of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded does not violate due process if conducted in the exercise
of professional judgment); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) (state must meet
the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in a civil commitment proceeding instead
of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in criminal trials).
86. Conservatorship,40 Cal. 3d at 164, 707 P.2d at 774, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 401
87. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 275, 625 P.2d
779, 792-93, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 880 (1981).
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Consent Statute would fail the stricter "compelling state interest" standard. This Note will therefore evaluate the statute under the "significant
state interest" test.
In addition to a demonstrated state interest, minimum threshold
standards for the significant interest test established under federal law
require that state restrictions on the right to procreative choice cannot be
unduly burdensome and must be narrowly drawn to express only significant state interests. 88 California courts have imposed two additional requirements on statutes burdening privacy rights: (1) they must be
necessary to accomplish a permitted state policy, and (2) they must be
the least obtrusive means by which it can effectuate that policy. These
requirements have been extended to minors by a California appellate
court 89 and to incompetent adult women by the California Supreme
Court. 90 Given the importance of the right to procreative choice to the
lives and futures of pregnant minors, and California's policy of protecting privacy rights more aggressively, 9 1 the protection of these additional
requirements should be extended to all California minors.
B. Rights of Parents
Both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme
Court have recognized that parental authority to supervise and direct the
rearing of their children is basic to the structure of our society. 92 Parents
have a fundamental interest in "guid[ing] the religious future and education of their children.1 93 This interest is grounded in the history and
culture of western civilization 94 and is coupled with a duty to prepare the
child for societal obligations, including the duty to "inculcat[e] moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." 95
Parental rights to direct the upbringing of their children, however,
are not absolute. 96 Under-federal and California law, parental authority
88. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155-56 (1973).
89. Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 279, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 379 (1986).
90.

Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 165, 707 P.2d 760, 774, 219 Cal. Rptr.

387, 402 (1985).
91. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
92. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); County of Los Angeles v. Soto, 35
Cal. 3d 483, 488, 674 P.2d 750, 753, 198 Cal. Rptr. 779, 782 (1984); In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679,
688, 523 P.2d 244, 250, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 450 (1974).
93. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (recognizing the rights of Amish par-

ents to ignore mandatory school attendance statutes).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 233; see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); see also Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
96. In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, 916, 623 P.2d 198, 202, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637, 641

(1981).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

is accorded constitutional protection only against unwarranted or unreasonable interference by the state, 97 and it is subordinate to the fundamental rights of the children. 98 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,99 the
United States Supreme Court established that parental consent cannot
stand as a complete obstacle to a minor's exercise of her right to procreative choice. The Court, however, also suggested that some parental involvement could be legislatively mandated. 1°°
In later decisions, the Court struggled with the problem of determining the permitted scope of parental involvement in a minor's decision
to terminate her pregnancy.10 1 The "mature minor" and "best interests"
standards evolved as an attempt to reconcile the several countervailing
interests inherent in the abortion decisions of minors: the state and parental interests of protecting immature minors from improvident abortion decisions; the state and parental interests in strengthening the family
unit; the state interest in allowing an immature minor to obtain a confidential abortion when her family situation indicates that such confidentiality serves her best interest; and a mature minor's interest in exercising
10 2
her fundamental right.
Under these standards, the right of a sufficiently mature minor to
make an independent abortion decision outweighs any interest the parent
might have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy. 0 3 In
the case of an immature minor whose best interests are deemed to be
served by a confidential abortion, the state's interest in protecting the
minor from potential harm posed by a breach of confidentiality out1
weighs any interest the parent might have in the minor's abortion. o4
97. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73 (1976). Under federal law, the
parental authority referred to in the Meyer, Pierce, Yoder, and Prince cases reflects analysis of
parental rights as compared to the state's interests, but does not suggest the proper ordering of

parental and children's rights that are in conflict.
98. See In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 403, 595 P.2d 105, 110, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, 676
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979) (warrantless, parent-approved police search of minor's personal property held an unlawful invasion of privacy); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921,
930-31, 569 P.2d 1286, 1291-92, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 303-04 (1977) (minor entitled to due
process right to challenge parents' attempt to confine him involuntarily in mental institution).
99. 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976).
100. Id. at 75.
101. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-93 (1983); City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-42 (1983); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-51 (1979).
102. See generally Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
103. See Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 650; Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181
Cal. App. 3d 245, 278-79, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 379.
104. Parental authority may be curtailed " 'if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child.' " In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 928, 569 P.2d 1286,
1289, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 302 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972));
see Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 424, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 792 (1983)
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Parents still maintain, however, their right to guide the moral upbringing of their children and express their views on sex, abortion, and
childbirth; yet there is no absolute right to be involved in their daughter's
abortion decision except in the limited context of immature
minors
10 5
whose best interests are not served by a confidential abortion.
C. Interests of the State
The final interests that must be examined are those of the state,
which are indicated in the legislative findings in Assembly Bill 2274.
Section 1 provides that:
(a) the medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an
abortion are serious and can be lasting, particularly when the patient is
an immature minor; (b) the capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for exercising mature judgment concerning the wisdom of an
abortion are not logically related; (c) minors often lack the ability to
make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and
long range consequences of their actions; (d) parents ordinarily possess
information essential to a physician's exercise of his or her best medical judgment concerning a minor child; and (e) parents who are aware
that their minor daughter has had an abortion may better ensure that
06
she receives adequate medical attention subsequent to her abortion.1
The state, as defendants in American Academy of Pediatricsv. Van
De Kamp, 10 7 advanced interests to justify parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions that mirror those set forth in the statute. The
state argued that these interests included: (1) protecting an immature
minor from the adverse consequences of an uninformed abortion decision; (2) protecting parental rights and the related interest in preserving
and strengthening the family as viable and stable unit in society; and (3)
ensuring that a minor receives adequate m~dical attention during and
after the procedure. 108

As discussed above, federal law permits state interference with minors' fundamental rights only if it can be justified by significant state
(order granting guardianship to persons other than parents affirmed); In re Angelia P., 28 Cal.
3d 908, 927, 623 P. 2d 198, 208, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637, 648 (1981) (permanent termination of
parental rights affirmed).
105. Cf Doe v. Irwin 615 F.2d 1162, 1168-69 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829
(1980) (by permitting minors to obtain contraceptive services without parental consent or
notification, state did not infringe on parents' constitutional liberty interests; parents remained
free to exercise care, custody, and control over minor children).
106. Chapter 1237, supra note 8.
107. No. 884574 (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Francisco, Dec. 28, 1987) (order granting preliminary
injunction); No. A-040-856 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1987) (request for emergency hearing denied); No. S-003818 (Cal. Feb. 25, 1988) (request for emergency hearing denied) appealdocketed, No. A-040-911 (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 8, 1988).
108.

Id.
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interests that are not present in the case of an adult. 1° 9 The interest in
protecting minors by ensuring that the abortion decision is informed has
been recognized as significant"O due to the vulnerability of minors and
"their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner." '' Likewise, the interest in preserving and strengthening the family
has long been considered significant, although in this context, it is subject
2
to the limits of the maturity/best interest standards."
The final interest, that of ensuring that minors receive adequate
medical care, would probably fail the "significant interest" test. This interest is best understood as an interest in safeguarding maternal health.
The Roe decision indicated that, at least for adult women, the state's
interest in protecting maternal health could not justify state intervention
until after the first trimester. 13 To qualify as significant, the state must
show that its interest in safeguarding maternal health is stronger when
the woman seeking an abortion is a minor.' '4 Since abortions generally
pose fewer risks to teenagers than to older women," t5 the state cannot
make this showing. Thus, this interest cannot justify the burdening of a
minor's fundamental right.
In summary, the state can probably show that its interests in ensuring an informed abortion decision and in preserving and strengthening
the family are significant. But under California law, the state must make
an additional showing that the legislation is necessary to accomplish a
permitted state interest and that it is the least obtrusive means of accomplishing that policy. Before determining whether the state interests can
justify restrictions of minors' fundamental rights, the nature and scope of
the obstacles imposed on the exercise of procreative choice will be
examined.
Two types of obstacles are imposed by parental involvement statutes, and each forms the basis of a separate constitutional challenge. The
first type limits a minor's privacy rights by permitting a third party to
veto the minor's abortion decision and therefore provides grounds for
attacking the facial validity of California's Parental Consent Statute.
The second type of obstacle results from the practical problems inherent
in judicial by-pass procedures and therefore provides grounds for attack109. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
110. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Wynn v.
Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1978).
111. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
112. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Wynn, 582 F.2d at 1385-86.
113. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 435; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
114. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
115. Cates, Schulz & Grimes, The Risks Associated with Teenage Abortion, 309 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 624, 643 (1983).
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ing the statute as functionally burdensome. These obstacles will be examined in the following two sections.
IV.

Constitutional Challenge: Third Party Veto

The United States Supreme Court has limited federal court scrutiny
of parental consent statutes to the determination of whether the law conforms to the standards set forth in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti11).11 6 Under
these standards, a parental consent statute is constitutionally sound if it
provides an expedited, anonymous, and nonburdensome procedure by
which a mature minor, or an immature minor whose best interests are
served by a17confidential abortion may obtain judicial authorization for an
abortion.'
California's Parental Consent Statute provides an expedited procedure by requiring that a hearing be set within three days of the petition
filing. Anonymity is ensured by the use of initials or a pseudonym." 8
The statute also allows for the necessary case-by-case determination of
maturity: 119
(1) If the court finds that the minor is sufficiently mature and sufficiently informed to make the decision on her own regarding an abortion, and that the minor has, on that basis, consented thereto, the court
shall grant the petition.
(2) If the court finds that the minor is not sufficiently mature and sufficiently informed to make the decision on her own regarding an abortion, the court shall then consider whether performance of the abortion
would be in the best interest of the minor. In the event that the court
finds that the performance of the abortion would be in the minor's best
interest, the court shall grant the petition ordering the performance of
the abortion without the consent of, or notice to, the parents or guardian. In the event that the court finds that the performance of the abortion is not
in the best interest of the minor, the court shall deny the
120
petition.
Thus, since California's Parental Consent Statute provides for an expedited and confidential judicial by-pass alternative, it would undoubtedly
pass judicial scrutiny under the Bellotti II standards.
Justice Stevens, however, argued in his Bellotti 11 concurrence' 2 1
116. 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979); see Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476, 490-94 (1983) (majority endorsed judicial bypass procedure outlined by Justice Powell in
Bellotti II and treated a challenge to Missouri's consent/bypass statute purely as an issue of
statutory construction).
117. BellottiI, 443 U.S. at 643-44, 648.
118. Chapter 1237, supra note 8, § 3(b).
119. Bellotti II 443 U.S. at 643 n.23; City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 441 (1983).
120. Chapter 1237, supra note 8, § 3(c).
121. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 654-56 (Stevens, Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan, J.J.,
concurring).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

that parental consent statutes, even with judicial by-pass alternatives, result in a third party veto of a minor's right to procreative choice and
violate the principles set forth in Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth.,22 In
finding a parental consent requirement (unaccompanied by a judicial bypass procedure) and a spousal consent requirement unconstitutional, the
Danforth Court held that "the state does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute and possibly arbitrary veto over
the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's
pregnancy regardless of the reason for withholding consent." 123
Under California's Parental Consent Statute, a minor, whose parents deny consent or who chooses not to seek parental consent, must
petition the court for approval of her abortion decision. The judge must
take into account the minor's maturity or the best interests of the minor.
The statute does not elaborate on how the judge is to do this. As Justice
Stevens pointed out in Bellotti II:
[These criteria provide] little real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores
whose enforcement upon the minor-particularly when contrary to
her own informed and reasonable decision-is fundamentally at odds
with privacy interests
underlying the constitutional protection afforded
1 24
to her decision.

Delegating consent authority to the judiciary rather than to another
third party does not make that veto power any less absolute, nor does it
guarantee that it will not be exercised in an arbitrary manner, especially
when governed by such vague criteria. 125 This "most intimate and fundamental of all constitutional rights"' 2 6 deserves greater protection
against state intervention posing potential absolute obstacles to the exercise of that right. The United States Supreme Court twice has divided
narrowly on the merits of the third party veto argument.127 Since California courts are free to reach their own conclusions, they should reaffirm the broader protections of California's privacy rights. Accordingly,
they should follow Justice Stevens' better-reasoned approach and find
California's Parental Consent Statute unconstitutional for permitting
122. 428 U.S. 52, 70, 74, 90 (1976).
123. Id. at 74.
124. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 655-56.
125. In the two states utilizing the standards, judges have failed to agree on how maturity
or best interests should be determined. See ACLU, supra note 4, at 16; McManus, May I
Judge?, Boston Globe, June 15, 1987, Magazine at 47; Yates & Pliner, JudgingMaturity in the
Courts: The Massachusetts Consent Statute, 78 Am. J. Pub. Health 646, 647-79 (1988) (Study
of judicial determination found no discernable pattern; the representing attorney and judge
identified same individual as immature in only one case.).
126. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 275, 625 P.2d
779, 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 880 (1981).
127. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 503, 505 (1983) (5-4 decision);
Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643, 654 (5-4 decision).
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third parties to exercise an absolute veto power over a minor's abortion
decision.
V.
A.

Constitutional Challenge: California's Parental Consent
Statute Is Functionally Burdensome

General Obstacles to Exercise of Procreative Choice

The obstacles that California's statute raises to a minor's exercise of
her right to procreative choice are not limited to third party veto power.
Practical problems inherent in the judicial by-pass alternatives substantially burden this fundamental right. 128 Indeed, these statutes add to the
difficulties minors already face in obtaining an abortion.
Regardless of age, many women in California have limited access to
abortion services. The most recent statistics show that over fifty percent
of all California counties have no identified abortion providers or are
served by only one provider. 12 9 In other areas, access to services has
been limited as physicians concerned about recent violence toward abortion providers have begun to refer abortion patients elsewhere.130
Women living in underserved counties must travel lengthy distances
to obtain an abortion. For example, San Bernardino county covers a
20,000 square mile area and has only one abortion provider.13 1 Limited
transportation forces some women to stay overnight-compounding the
difficulties in arranging time away from jobs and family responsibilities,
and increasing the requisite costs to obtain services.132
Even without the parental consent law, teenagers face special
problems in obtaining abortions. Arranging transportation and raising
money for an abortion are more difficult for teenagers due to their limited
resources. 133 Adolescents frequently wait until later in their pregnancies
than older women to seek abortions. This delay is due to a number of
reasons: "Young women with irregular menstrual cycles take longer to
recognize the signs of pregnancy; teenagers generally have little experi128. See generally Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986), rev'd, 853 F.
2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); McManus, supra note 125.

129. MEDICAL CARE STATISTICS SEC., DEPT. OF HEALTH SERV., NUMBER OF ABORTION PROCEDURES BY PLACE OF OCCURRENCE PERFORMED IN HOSPITALS, CLINICS AND
PHYSICIANS' OFFICES, CALIF. 1984-85 (Apr. 1987) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal)

[hereinafter MEDICAL

CARE STATISTICS].

130. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 761-62.
131.

Membrandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 12,

American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, No. 884574 (Cal. Sup. Ct., San Francisco,
Dec. 28, 1987); No. A-040-856 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1987) (request for emergency hearing

denied); No. S-003818 (Cal. Feb. 25, 1988) (request for emergency hearing denied) appeal
docketed, No. A-040-911 (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 8; 1988) [hereinafter Memorandum]; MEDICAL
CARE STATISTICS, supra note 129.

132. ACLU, supra note 4, at 6.
133. I

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

tYol. 40

ence in obtaining health care services; and they have difficulty arranging
134
an inconspicuous absence from home or school."
As teenagers delay seeking services beyond the first trimester (generally after the first twelve weeks), their access to abortion is even further
limited. Seventy-two percent of abortion providers will perform an abortion through the tenth week of gestation; thirty-two percent will perform
one at thirteen weeks; twenty-one percent at fifteen weeks and only five
135
percent at twenty-one weeks.

B.

Burdens Imposed by Parental Consent Statutes

These general obstacles to obtaining an abortion are compounded by
the burdens imposed by parental involvement statutes. While legislators
and courts have assumed that parental involvement statutes meeting the
standards established by Justice Powell in Bellotti II are not unduly burdensome, 136 the United States Supreme Court has never evaluated the
practical effects of a judicial by-pass procedure. Indeed, Justice Stevens'
prediction that "a real statute-rather than a mere outline of a possible
statute-may well present questions that appear quite different from the
hypothetical questions ... address[ed]" 137 appears to have been realized
in those states using the judicial by-pass alternative. Data compiled in
two states where parental involvement statutes have been in effect suggest that practical problems inherent in judicial by-pass alternatives sub138
stantially burden a minor's right to procreative choice.
The nature and scope of the burdens that parental involvement statutes add to the exercise of minors' rights to procreative choice have been
examined in only one case, Hodgson v. Minnesota.139 After five weeks of
trial, the federal district court concluded that a parental notification statute was functionally burdensome and failed to further any state interests
in any meaningful way. 14° The statute under consideration required notification of both parents for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provided
a judicial alternative for mature minors and immature minors whose best
interests were served by a confidential abortion. While the Hodgson
court suggested that the system was unconstitutionally burdensome, it
134.

RISKING THE FUTURE, supra note 19, at 114.

135. Id. at 191.
136. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 779 (D. Minn. 1986), rev'd, 853 F.2d 1452
(8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
137. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 656 n.4 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 776 n. I.
138. See generally Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 762-64 (delay increases medical risk, costs,
and inconvenience; fear and tension cause minors to forego the bypass option); Donovan, supra
note 16 (bypass option causes delay due to limited access to courts; 35% of Massachusetts
minors go out of state to obtain an abortion).
139. 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986), rev'd, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
140. Id. at 775.
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felt constrained by Supreme Court precedent to invalidate the law on two
narrower grounds: the fact that both parents had to be notified and the
court's determination that a forty-eight hour mandatory waiting period
was too long. 14 1 The Eighth Circuit initially affirmed the lower court's
decision, but later reversed the district court on rehearing en banc. 142
Although the en banc court recognized that the difficulties the statute
posed to minors "compared to its effectiveness, raise[d] considerable
questions about the practical wisdom of [the] statute,"' 143 it viewed these
questions as more appropriately addressed by the legislature. 144 Accordingly, it limited its review to statutory construction, finding that the statute met the Bellotti II standards and was therefore constitutional.145 In
its cavalier dismissal of the district court's factual findings, the en bane
court failed to assess whether the statute actually furthered significant
state interests and whether it was narrowly drawn to express only those
interests.146 It merely assumed that the state interests justified any burdens imposed as a matter of law. 147 By deferring the question of the
proper balance between state interests and the burdens on minors' pricourt abdicated its responsibilvacy rights to the legislature, the en banc
14
ity as protector of fundamental rights.
Given its role as the final arbiter of the meaning of the constitution, 149 the California courts are uniquely qualified to define the limits of
the privacy rights of California minors. To properly determine whether
California's Parental Consent Statute exceeds the permitted bounds of
state interference, California courts must examine the true effects of parental involvement statutes. While the district court opinion offers only
limited authority to California courts, the statistics and testimony
presented, based on five years' experience with the statute, 150 give valua141. Id. at 778-80.
142. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir.), vacated and withdrawn, reh'g denied, 835 F.2d 1545 (8th Cir.), vacation and withdrawal rescinded, reh'g granted, 835 F.2d
1546 (8th Cir.), rev'd, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
143. Hodgson, 1988 U.S. App. Lexis 10924 at 25.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 46; supra note 61 and accompanying text.
147. Hodgson, 1988 U.S. App. Lexis at 26.
148. See, &g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (invalidating on equal
protection grounds a statute which authorized the sterilization of repeat felons because the
classification could not meet the strict scrutiny test used to evaluate laws infringing on the
fundamental rights to marriage and procreation); id. at 544 (Stone, J., concurring) ("There are
limits to the extent to which the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed, especially
where the liberty of a person is concerned ...." (citing United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
149. Committe to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 261, 675 P.2d
779, 783, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870 (1980).
150. ACLU, supra note 4, at 1.
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ble insight into the functional effects of judicial and parental substitute
consent requirements.
(1) The Judicial By-Pass Alternative Is Not an Option for Some Minors
According to the ACLU, the judicial by-pass procedure is placed
outside the reach of some minors because of fear, inaccessibility, delay,
and lack of resources. 1 5 1 The Hodgson court agreed, stating that
"[s]ome mature minors and some minors in whose best interests it is to
proceed without notifying their parents are so daunted by the judicial
proceeding that they forego the by-pass option and either notify their
parents or carry to term." 152 Minors from abusive families are most
likely to avoid the by-pass procedure as it entails a risk of exposing secret
abuse or precipitating more abuse or both. 153 Those lacking transportation and the sophistication to navigate the by-pass procedure can also be
deterred from pursuing the court option. To some California minors
who lack resources or are victims of abuse, or both, these obstacles will
undoubtedly prove insurmountable as well.
(2) The Court ProcedureIs Traumatic
For minors who have availed themselves of the judicial by-pass option, the experience generally has been emotionally and sometimes physically traumatizing.1 54 Some consider it more difficult than the medical
procedure itself.155 After hearing the testimony of judges, clinic counselors, public defenders, guardians ad litem, and adolescents who had
sought judicial authorization for their abortions, the Hodgson court
stated:
The experience of going to court for a judicial authorization procedure produces fear and tension in many minors. Minors are apprehensive about the prospect of facing an authority figure who holds in
his hands the power to veto their decision to proceed without notifying
one or both of their parents. Many minors are angry and resentful at
being required to justify their decision before complete strangers. Despite the confidentiality of the proceedings, many minors resent having
151. Id. at 12.
152. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763. In Minneapolis, where the most complete data was
available, the birth rate for fifteen to seventeen year olds rose 38.4% from 1980-84, whereas the
birth rate for eighteen to nineteen year olds rose a mere 0.3% during the same period. In
addition, for the entire state, the abortion rate for fifteen to seventeen year olds declined much
more significantly than for eighteen to nineteen year olds. ACLU, supra note 4, at 7.
153. ACLU, supra note 4, at 9-10.
154. Id. at 13. In the Hodgson trial, public defenders, guardians ad litem, clinic personnel, and judges testified that the by-pass procedure was a frightening, traumatic experience for
the women they saw. Many minors were embarrassed at being in court, and some were so
upset they became physically ill. Id.; see Clay & Henry, California'sParentalConsent to Abortion Law Enjoined, YOUTH L. NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 15.
155. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763-64.
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to reveal intimate details of their personal and family lives to these
strangers. Finally, minors are left feeling guilty and ashamed156about
their lifestyle and their decision to terminate their pregnancy.
The Minnesota by-pass procedure took place in county courts and
juvenile courts. While California's Parental Consent Statute requires
that hearings be conducted solely in juvenile court, 157 there is no indication that hearing the petitions exclusively in that setting will be any less
stressful. A minor must still discuss very intimate details of her personal
life with an authority figure holding veto power over her abortion decision. Undoubtedly, California minors will be no less traumatized by the
by-pass procedure under scrutiny here.
(3) Confidentiality CannotBe Adequately Preserved

The Minnesota law required that by-pass proceedings be kept
strictly confidential, and the district court noted that confidentiality had
been breached in only a few instances. 15 8 One judge, however, testified
that some minors did not seek hearings before judges in their home counties because they were afraid of being recognized by people who worked
in and around the courthouse.1 59 Minors seeking judicial authorization
for abortions were easily recognizable and "st[ood] out like sore thumbs
160
[in the courtroom]."'
Like the Minnesota statute, California's Parental Consent Statute
also requires confidentiality. Unlike the Minnesota statute, however, AB
2274 requires juvenile courts to hear all the petitions.1 61 The risk of a
breach of confidentiality is arguably reduced in this setting since age
alone will not serve to identify the reason for the minor's visit to the
court. The problem of being recognized by friends and neighbors, however, is no less acute in a juvenile court setting, especially in small
communities.
(4) Courthouse Logistics May Burden Minor's Use of the By-Pass Option

Under the hearing schedule mandated by California's Parental Consent Statute, judgment on a petition must be entered in a maximum of
four days from the time of filing; judgment on appeal must be entered
within six days of filing notice of appeal-a theoretical total of ten
days.162 While a court must make a hearing available within the time
required by statute, a teenager may not be able to get to court within that
time due to difficulties in arranging transportation and time away from
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Chapter 1237, supra note 8, § 3b.
Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763.
ACLU, supra note 4, at 12.
Id. at 13.
Chapter 1237, supra note 8, § 3b.
Id.
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home, school, or work. Teenagers without access to a car must rely upon
public transportation, which is problematic in some counties. 63 These
problems are exacerbated for teenagers from counties with a limited
number of courthouses. Seventeen counties are served by only one superior court judge.1 64 The largest of these, Inyo county, is 10,000 square
miles. 1665
While the transportation difficulties may be formidable, they are
compounded by scheduling problems. Rules promulgated by the Judicial
Council require that "[i]nsofar as practicable, [hearings] must be scheduled so as not to interfere with school attendance."1 66 The increased financial burden California's Parental Consent Statute is expected to
impose on the counties, however, makes it unlikely that they will be able
to shoulder any additional expense in extending court hours.167 In the
current eight-to-five or even eight-to-six judicial work day, there is little
room to schedule hearings that do not interfere with school attendance,
especially if teenagers must travel lengthy distances to the courthouse.
At a minimum, an adolescent will have to make two trips to court, one
for the filing and one for the hearing. Any appeals will, of course, necessitate further travel. These multiple trips may result in unexplained absences, making a breach of confidentiality more likely.
Even if teenagers are able to surmount transportation and scheduling difficulties, many courts may be unable to comply with the statute's
hearing schedule. The increased burden on the court system will undoubtedly result in clogged calendars and some courts will be unable to
change their practice of hearing juvenile matters once a week or bimonthly. 68 At times, some counties served by one judge will be unable
69
to find a substitute when the judge is ill, on vacation, or disqualified.
163. Memorandum, supra note 131, at 12.
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id.
166. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, at 8, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, No. 884574 (Cal. Sup. Ct.,
San Francisco, Dec. 28, 1987) (draft of order granting preliminary injunction); No. A-040-856
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1987) (request for emergency hearing denied); No. S-003818 (Cal. Feb.
25, 1988) (request for emergency hearing denied) appeal docketed No. A-040-911 (Cal. Ct.
App., Aug. 8, 1988).
167. See Memorandum, supra note 131, at 14 n.7. It is estimated that millions of dollars
will be required to deal with the increased burden on the court system from abortion petitions
alone. Since the legislature has not authorized additional funding, the counties will have to
shoulder the increased financial burden of any increase in court hours. Id.
168. See id. at 14; see also Declaration in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Rumsey Declaration at 3, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, No. 884574 (Cal.
Sup. Ct., San Francisco, Dec. 28, 1987) (draft of order granting preliminary injunction); No.
A-040-856 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1987) (request for emergency hearing denied); No. S003818 (Cal. Feb. 25, 1988) (request for emergency hearing denied), appeal docketed, No. A040-911 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1988).
169. See Memorandum, supra note 131, at 14.
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Some judges may also refuse to hear petitions on moral or political
grounds. 170 These logistical problems will substantially delay, if not
deny, some minors' access to the judicial alternative.
(5) Delays in ObtainingAbortions Subject Minors to IncreasedHealth Risks
A delay of any magnitude undoubtedly increases emotional tension
attendant to the judicial proceeding and resolution of the unwanted pregnancy. 17 1 For minors forced to obtain an abortion after the second trimester, the delay is even more significant. Second trimester abortions are
more costly, 172 are provided by fewer clinics, require greater skill to perform, and pose greater risks of uterine perforation, hemorrhage, and
other complications. 173 According to Willard Cates, former head of the
Abortion Surveillance Branch of the Centers for Disease Control, "delay
[in getting an abortion] has the largest single effect on the risk to teenagers for complications and death from abortion."' 74 Indeed, "the
probability of mortality increases approximately thirty percent for each
175
week of gestation between eight weeks and twenty weeks."'
Statistics compiled while Minnesota's parental notification statute
was in effect showed a 26.5 percent increase in the number of minors who
obtained second trimester abortions. 76 Since California's requirements
for expeditious hearings mirror those in the Minnesota statute, it is likely
that the performance of minors' abortions in California will be similarly
delayed, resulting in an equivalent rise in second trimester abortions
177
among teenagers.
Under California law, the right to procreative choice encompasses
not only the woman's right to choose, but the woman's own right to
170. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 762-63 (D. Minn. 1986), rev'd, 853 F. 2d
1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see Donovan, supra note 16, at 259, 264 (re-election concerns
may prevent a judge from hearing petitions).
171. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 762.
172. The following fee schedule is an example of the average cost of abortion services in
California: Under 12 weeks gestation, $250; 12 to 14 weeks, $300; 14 to 16 weeks, $350. After
16 weeks pregnant women are referred to a hospital, where abortions cost approximately
$1000. (Data compiled from telephone interviews from various San Francisco abortion providers who requested to remain anonymous). For an example of the abortion fee scale in Minnesota, see Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 761.
173. ACLU, supra note 4, at 14; Grimes & Shulz, Morbidity and Mortalityfrom Second
Trimester Abortions, 30 J. REPRODUCTIVE MED. 505, 506 (1985).
174. Cates, Adolescent Abortions in the United States, J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 18,

20 (1980).
175. Memorandum, supra note 131, at 18.
176. ACLU, supra note 4, at 15.
177. While Minnesota's law did not set specific limits as to when a hearing must be held,
two or three days generally elapsed between a minor's first contact with the court and the
hearing on her petition. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp at 762.
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life. 178 The judicial by-pass alternative burdens both rights by giving a
third party veto power over the woman's decision and by imposing delays that will increase the risk of mortality to those requiring second trimester abortions.
(6) ParentalInvolvement Laws Compromise Health Care

States experienced with parental involvement laws have seen the
provision of abortion services compromised in two important ways. One
aspect of care affected, involved the use of laminaria. Laminaria is a
seaweed extract often used to soften and dilate the cervix prior to the
abortion procedure. While abortions generally pose fewer risks to teenagers than to older women, teenagers are at greater risk of suffering cervical injury. 179 Since laminaria may decrease the risk of injury, some
doctors believe that it should be used in some first trimester abortions for
adolescents. 180 To be fully effective, laminaria must be inserted in the
cervix at least six hours prior to the abortion. 18 1 For minors who, because of scheduling difficulties, try to complete the hearing and the abor18 2
tion in the same day, time constraints prohibit the use of laminaria.
The proper focus of the preabortion counseling sessions has also
been compromised as a result of the by-pass option. At the Hodgson
trial, experienced counselors testified "that both pre-court and post-court
counseling tended to center on the court experience and the feelings it
evoked rather than on the minor's thoughts, feelings and concerns about
the abortion procedure itself. 1 83 The time required to deal with the bypass procedure meant less time to address the important issues in a minor's life and the details of the procedure and after care.
C. The State Cannot Justify Burdens Imposed
It is beyond question that California's Parental Consent Statute will
burden a minor's right to procreative choice. Not only is there potential
for an arbitrary third party veto, the judicial by-pass alternative is emotionally and sometimes physically traumatizing. It delays abortions,
forcing some minors to obtain riskier and more costly abortions; it undermines the provision of quality medical care; and it jeopardizes the
privacy of women seeking authorization. Indeed, for some minors with
limited resources, the judicial alternative may not even be an option.
178. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359
(1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
179. Cates, Schultz & Grimes, supra note 115, at 624.
180. Id.; see also Grimes, Schulz & Cates, Prevention of Uterine PerforationDuring Curettage Abortion, 251 J. A.M.A. 2108 (1984).
181. ACLU, supra note 4, at 14.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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To sustain the constitutionality of legislation burdening a minor's
fundamental right, the state must show that the privacy burden serves a
significant state interest that is not present in the case of an adult. 184 The
regulation must be necessary to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy and narrowly drawn, not of unlimited and indiscriminate
sweep.185 The following sections will examine each of the interests advanced by the state and demonstrate why none of these interests can justify the burdens imposed.
(1) Interest in Informed Consent
The first interest advanced by the state to justify its substitute consent requirement is the protection of immature minors from adverse consequences of an uninformed abortion decision. While protection of
immature minors is by definition a significant state interest not present in
the case of an adult, California's Parental Consent Statute must serve
that interest to justify the burdens imposed.
Generally, adolescents do not differ from adults in their ability to
understand and reason about treatment alternatives, 186 even in abortion
decision making.1 87 Research suggests that by age fourteen, adolescents
have developed moral and intellectual maturity approaching the level of
an adult and are capable of weighing the many' factors involved in the
abortion decision. 188 The statute protects neither these mature minors
nor immature best interests minors. Mature minors capable of giving
informed consent do not need the state's protection. Immature minors
whose best interests are served by a confidential abortion are not protected from their own uninformed decision. A judicial best interests determination necessarily indicates that the interests served by having the
abortion outweigh the dangers inherent in an uninformed abortion
decision.
184. Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 279, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 379 (1986) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
185. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 163-64, 707 P.2d 760, 773-74, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 401 (1985); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 969, 458 P.2d 194, 200, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 360 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
186. ACLU, supra note 4, at 5; Melton & Pliner, supra note 4, at 18-19; see Weithorn &
Campbell, The Competency of Children andAdolescents To Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982); Yates & Pliner, supra note 125, at 646.
187. Few age-related differences in consultation patterns or factors affecting the decision
have been found. Minors differed from adults in that they were more likely to perceive their
decision as externally determined (result of third party wishes) and were less likely to consult a
professional about the decision. These differences are easily attributed to differences in minors'
and adults' social status. Melton & Pliner, supra note 4, at 19.
188. ACLU, supra note 4, at 5 (citing L. KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DE-

VELOPMENT (1985);

DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR

(T. Lickona ed. 1976); Smetana, Reason-

ing in the Personal and Moral Domains: Adolescent and Young Adult Women's Decision
Making RegardingAbortion, 2 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 211 (1981)).
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Since California's Parental Consent Statute is aimed at immature
minors, does the judicial by-pass alternative really protect immature,
non-best interest minors from making uninformed abortion decisions?
Data compiled from Minnesota and Massachusetts suggests that parental
involvement statutes with judicial by-pass alternatives do not meet that
objective. In those two states, judicial authorization for abortion was
granted to 99.7 percent of the more than 6,500 adolescents who utilized
the by-pass option. 189 In the Hodgson trial, the district court noted that
the denial of an infinitesimal proportion of the petitions for judicial consent indicated that "in Minnesota immature, non-best interest minors
rarely seek judicial authorization to terminate their pregnancies without
parental involvement. Such minors either inform their parents, obtain an
abortion outside Minnesota or carry the pregnancy to term." 190
This phenomenon may be explained by the developmental nature of
adolescents. A minor's desire to maintain privacy in personal matters
increases with adolescent development. 19' In addition, "comparisons of
personality functioning between adolescents who abort and those who
carry to term generally show more adaptive, healthier functioning in the
former group." 192 Adaptation, in turn, marks a level of psychological
development known generally as "maturity."'' 93 Thus, as the district
court noted, "a regulation that affects only minors who have elected to
terminate their pregnancies and do so in privacy, tends inevitably to
reach only mature minors and immature minors driven to this choice by
their own best interests." 1 94 There is no indication that this statute will
function any more effectively in California.
California's Parental Consent Statute is not only unlikely to serve
this state interest, it is unnecessary to accomplish the goal of informed
consent. Under tort law, a physician who fails to obtain valid consent
before performing a surgical procedure is liable for committing a battery.' 95 While California decisional law has recognized the ability of mi189. In Minnesota 3,573 petitions were filed, six were withdrawn prior to hearing, and
nine were denied. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986), rev'd, 853
F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Of over 3,000 petitions filed in Massachusetts, 11 were
denied, and 10 of those were reversed on appeal within 72 hours. McManus, supra note 125, at
14.
190. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 767; Donovan, supra note 16, at 261 (data from three states
with parental involvement laws indicate that 16 and 17 year olds obtain judicial consent;
younger minors are more likely to confide in their parents).
191. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 767.
192. Id.; see Morin-Gorithier & Lortie, The Significance of Pregnancy Among Adolescents
Choosing Abortion as Compared to Those Continuing Pregnancy,29 J. REPRODUCTIVE MED.
255, 258 (1984).
193. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 767.
194. Id. at 768.
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 53 (1965).
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nors to consent to abortions without parental involvement since 1971,
the ability to consent has been subject to the implicit limitation that
the minor must be of sufficient maturity to give informed consent ....
A minor of any age who is unable to convince competent medical authorities that she has the requisite understanding and maturity to give
an informed consent for ...a therapeutic abortion, will be denied such
196
treatment without the consent of either a parent or a legal guardian.
Abortion counseling is available at clinics to all women seeking
abortion services. Standard medical practice includes explaining the procedure and its attendant risks, obtaining informed consent and confirming that it was the patient's own decision to have the procedure. 197 Thus,
the burdening of a minor's right to procreative choice is unnecessary to
ensure informed consent because California law already requires that
professionals make sure the minor has made an informed choice.
An examination of the risks involved in adolescent abortions also
suggests that the risks are not significant enough to necessitate the burdening of a fundamental right. In terms of physical effects, abortion carries much lower risks of morbidity and mortality than continued
pregnancy. 198 Indeed, the mortality rate from pregnancy continuation is
five times higher for teenagers than the mortality rate associated with
adolescent abortion.1 9 9
The research on psychological risks is less clear and less extensive.
While abortion is a stressful situation, studies have found that it is not
likely to lead to severe emotional distress, especially in women who do
not have preexisting problems. 20° "The predominant response following
abortion is generally relief." 20 1 Although there is some evidence of
slightly greater negative effects on adolescents, the magnitude of differences between adult women and teenagers is not generally great, and the
negative reactions of adolescents (primarily depression) are relatively
mild.20 2 Severe emotional responses are very rare.20 3

It should also be

noted that childbearing is not without psychological risk. One study has
196.

Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883, 484 P.2d 1345, 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8

(1971) (citation omitted).
197. ACLU, supra note 4, at 4; Henshaw, FreestandingAbortion Clinics: Services, Structures, Fees, 14 FAMILY PLAN. PERSP. 248, 253 (1982).
198. ACLU, supra note 4, at 4. Rosenberg & Rosenthal, Reproductive Mortality in the
United States: Recent Trends andMethodologies Consideration,77 AM. J. PUBL. HEALTH 833,
834 (1987).
199. Cates, Abortionsfor Teenagers, in ABORTION AND STERILIZATION: MEDICAL AND
SOCIAL ASPECTS 139-47 (J.E. Hodgson ed. 1981).

200. Adler & Dolcini, PsychologicalIssues in Abortion for Adolescents, in ADOLESCENT
ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 84, 84 (G. Melton ed. 1986).

201. Id.
202. RISKING THE FUTURE, supra note 19, at 196; Adler & Dolcini, supra note 200, at 85.
203.

RISKING THE FUTURE, supra note 19, at 196; Maracek, Consequences of Adolescent

Childbearingand Abortion, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION:
SUES 96, 110 (G. Melton 1986).

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL IS-
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shown "a rate of post-partum depression three times that of negative
emotional sequelae following induced abortion. ' ' 2°4 Additionally, "legal
States have no demonstrable negative
abortions performed in the United
5
effects on later pregnancies.

' 20

The state has alternative, less obtrusive means by which to effectuate
its interest in protecting minors from the adverse consequences of an uninformed abortion decision. The main risks of adolescent abortion entail
the psychological and emotional effects. To meet the needs of minors, the
state could easily achieve its goal by increasing both the pre- and postabortion counseling services available to minors.
The parental consent statute must also fail constitutional scrutiny
because its reach extends beyond the boundaries necessary to express this
significant state interest. As indicated above, the vast majority of minors
seeking judicial approval are either mature or immature non-best interests minors. In seeking to ensure that immature minors' consent is informed, the state is requiring all minors-both mature and immature-to
obtain substitute consent, thus burdening the rights of mature minors.
The burden is substantial and cannot be justified by a state interest unlikely to be served by a law creating that burden.
In addition, the state must show that the burden imposed is a ra20 6
tional means for the accomplishment of some significant state policy.

The fact that it cannot do so suggests that this law was not really
designed to further this state interest. If the California Legislature is
truly concerned about protecting immature minors from the hazards of
uninformed consent, it is approaching the problem in a rather uneven
manner. Even with the Parental Consent Statute, California law will allow unmarried and otherwise unemancipated minors to give informed
consent to a variety of medical treatments.
California Civil Code section 34.5, as amended by AB 2274,207 will
allow pregnant minors of any age to give informed consent to treatment
of hospital, medical, and surgical care related to the prevention or treatment of pregnancy. This necessarily includes consent to caesarian section, amniocentesis, and the use of anaesthesia-procedures technically
far more complicated than abortion. Under California's medical emancipation statutes, minors over the age of twelve may consent without pa-9
20 8 rape,20
rental approval to treatment for sexually transmitted diseases,
204. ACLU, supra note 4, at 4.
205. Id. One abortion has no negative effects on later pregnancy. Repeat induced abortion has not been studied sufficiently for possible negative effects on subsequent reproduction.
Hogue, Cates & Tietze, The Effects of Induced Abortion on Subsequent Reproduction, 4 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 66, 88-89 (1982).
206. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977).
207. Chapter 1237, supra note 8, § 2.
208. CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.7 (West 1982).
209. Id. § 34.8.
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and drug and alcohol abuse. 2 10 They may also seek mental health counseling. 2 11 Finally, minors of any age can consent to treatment for sexual
21 2
assault.
There is no justification for distinguishing informed consent to abortion from these other forms of treatment, especially the technically complicated procedures potentially involved in the treatment of pregnancy.
California's Parental Consent Statute can only be understood as an unconstitutional attempt to restrict minors' access to abortion.
(2) Interest in Adequate Medical Care
The state's interest in ensuring that a minor receives adequate medical attention necessarily involves protecting maternal health. Under California and federal precedent, this interest in protecting maternal health
cannot justify burdening an adult's privacy right until after the first trimester.21 3 The primary areas of state concerns involve provision of adequate medical information and supervised aftercare. 2 14 To justify
burdens imposed on a minor's right during the first trimester, the state
must show that minors are less competent in providing medical histories
and getting follow-up care than adults.
Studies show that adolescents are self-observant and are able to provide health histories as accurately as their parents. 2 15 The low incidence
of morbidity for adolescents who abort, as compared to both adult women who obtain abortions and adolescents who continue their pregnancy, indicates that the care adolescents receive during and after an
21 6
abortion is having comparatively few adverse effects on their health.
In the abortion context, there is no basis for distinguishing the abilities of minors and adults to provide health histories or follow-up care.
The fallacy that California's Parental Consent Statute was enacted to
protect the health of immature minors on these grounds is illustrated by
the fact that a minor presumed unable to give an accurate medical history or obtain adequate follow-up care for an abortion may give the same
medical history and supervise her own care if she chooses to continue her
pregnancy. Minors choosing to continue their pregnancies do not automatically become better health historians or more conscientious about
their health care. Indeed, the higher incidence of morbidity and mortality for minors continuing their pregnancies suggests a need for greater
parental supervision of minors choosing not to abort rather than those
210.
211.
212.

Id. § 34.10.
Id. § 25.9.
Id. § 34.9.

213. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 279, 625 P.2d 779, 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 882 (1981).
214. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
215. ACLU, supra note 4, at 5.
216. Melton & Pliner, supra note 4, at 16.
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choosing to terminate their pregnancies. Thus, legislation requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision, while permitting an
independent decision to continue pregnancy, cannot be justified on the
grounds of protecting minors' health.
(3) Preserving the Family Unit
The third state interest is in preserving and strengthening the family
as a viable and stable unit in society, with the related interest in safeguarding parental authority. This is recognized as a significant state interest not present in the case of an adult. The state, however, must show
that California's Parental Consent Statute serves that interest.
Even without legislative mandate, over fifty percent of pregnant adolescents already inform at least one of their parents of their abortion
decision. 2 17 Those minors who do consult their parents before an abortion tend to be younger adolescents, at greater risk of negative psychological effects from the procedure. 21 8 Additionally, parental involvement
laws do not significantly increase the likelihood that a minor will confide
2 19
in a parent.
A significant number of minors do not consult their parents. 2 20 One
study indicated that the most common reason for adolescents failing to
inform their parents is concern about disappointing or embarrassing their
parents. 22 1 The same study indicated that thirty percent did not tell their
parents because they feared adverse consequences. 22 2 In the Hodgson
trial, psychologists, judges, and counselors testified that minors are both
truthful and accurate in their assessment and description of their home
life and that fears about their family situations are well founded. 223 In
general, the reasons given by Minnesota minors who chose not to tell one
or both of their parents included psychiatric or physical illness of a parent; chemical abuse and dependency of a parent; religious or moral antiabortion or antisex views of a parent; and the likelihood of abusive
verbal, physical, or sexual responses by a parent. 224 California is not
without dysfunctional families. Undoubtedly, many California minors
will have similar reasons for pursuing confidential abortions.
For minors fortunate enough to live in a supportive family environ217.

Id. at 20; ACLU, supra note 4, at 4.

218.

Donovan, supra note 16, at 261; Melton & Pliner, supra note 4, at 20.

219. Blum, Resnick & Stark, The Impact of a Parental Notification Law On Adolescent
Abortion Decision-Making,77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 619, 620 (1987); Clay & Henry, supra note
154, at 14.
220. ACLU, supra note 4, at 4; Melton & Pliner, supra note 4, at 20; see Donovan, supra

note 14, at 261.
221.
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223.
224.

Melton & Pliner, supra note 4, at 20.
Id.
ACLU, supra note 4, at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
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ment, the law is unnecessary, since communication already exists in
those stable family units. For minors electing the judicial by-pass option,
this state interest is not served by the statute. The family environment is
neither supported nor protected because judicial consent will permit a
minor to obtain an abortion without any discussion with her parents.
For immature minors "so daunted by the judicial proceeding that they
forego the by-pass option and ...notify their parents, '225 however, the
law not only fails to support the family unit but may disrupt it.226 In
addition to parental disappointment and disapproval, the minor may
confront physical or emotional abuse and withdrawal of financial
227
support.
Effective communication cannot be coerced. This is especially true
where adolescent sexual activity is concerned. Many parents do not discuss sexuality or birth control with their daughters. 228 In families for
whom sex is a taboo topic, it would be surprising to find discussions becoming open and supportive with the announcement of their daughter's
229
pregnancy.
Legislation mandating intrafamily communication is unnecessary or
futile at best, and may lead to family disruption. Because it is ineffective
and possibly harmful, it cannot justify burdening a fundamental right.
Conclusion
California's Parental Consent Statute cannot be justified by its interests in promoting family communication, protecting immature minors
from uninformed abortion decisions, or protecting minors' health. The
law substantially burdens minors' rights to procreative choice, and the
burden falls almost entirely on minors mature enough to make an independent abortion decision or immature minors whose best interests are
served by a confidential abortion. 2 30 The law fails to further protection
23 1
of immature, non-best interest minors in any meaningful way.
Indeed, the disparity between the stated purposes of the statute and
its potential effects suggests that it is an impermissible attempt to deter
and prevent abortions. It is undisputed that the restrictions imposed by
this statute could not apply to adult women because their rights are fully
225.

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 763 (D. Minn. 1986), rev'd, 853 F.2d 1452

(8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
226. ACLU, supra note 4, at 8-9. "[T]he effect of compelling communication is unpredictable and frequently disastrous." Id. at 8. Following notification of a daughter's pregnancy,
some parents have refused to speak to the minor. In some cases notification has even resulted
in marital discord and divorce. Id
227. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 438-39 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
228. Melton & Pliner, supra note 4, at 21.
229. Id.
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protected under the law. The California Legislature seemingly has aimed
this law at minors because their right to procreative choice is vulnerable
to restriction.
An adolescent's abortion decision is an intensely personal one.
"Some minors, in some circumstances, have the capacity and the need to
'2 32
determine their health care needs without involving their parents.
For an adolescent, the ability to do so is central to control of her body,
her life, and her future. Full protection of one of the "most intimate and
fundamental of all constitutional rights" 233 should not depend on the arbitrary age of majority. For these reasons, California's Parental Consent
Statute should be permanently enjoined from enforcement.

232. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 454 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
233. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 275, 625 P.2d
779, 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 880 (1981).

